Hidāyat man ḥārā fī amr al-Naṣāra: The Western Sahara's Missing Witness at the International Court of Justice? by Blalack, July  Scott
HIDĀYAT MAN ḤĀRĀ FĪ AMR AL-NAṢĀRA: 
THE WESTERN SAHARA’S MISSING WITNESS AT 
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE  
JULY BLALACK 
SOAS, University of London 
Abstract 
The disputed Western Sahara is one of many cases where the colonial borders 
drawn across Africa did not translate into a coherent postcolonial state. Although 
dozens of legal and historical studies have already analyzed the 1975 International 
Court of Justice ruling on the Western Sahara, this article brings a highly relevant 
and previously neglected document into dialogue with the court proceedings. 
Hidāyat man ḥārā fī amr al-Naṣāra (“Guidance for Whomever is Confused 
Regarding the Christians”) was a legal ruling on territorial defense written in 1885 
by a central figure in Morocco’s nationalist narrative: Saharan scholar and resistance 
leader al-Shaikh Mā al-ʻAynayn (1831-1910). Although Morocco held Mā al-
ʻAynayn up as proof of its “immemorial possession” of the disputed Western Sahara, 
the case did not consult Mā al-ʻAynayn’s own thought or literature to see how he 
represented and interpreted historical events as they unfolded. Hidāyat man ḥārā fī 
amr al-Naṣāra offers new insight into how Saharan figures negotiated authority and 
legitimacy on the eve of colonization – especially internal debates regarding 
whether to contract peace with European settlers or forcibly expel them. The fatwa’s 
concepts of territory and sovereignty are compared to the historical narratives 
presented at the International Court of Justice in 1975.  
Keywords: Western Sahara, Mauritania, Morocco, International Court of Justice 
(ICJ), United Nations, fatwas. 
Résumé 
Le territoire contesté du Sahara Occidental est l’un des nombreux cas où les 
frontières coloniales tracées à travers l’Afrique n’ont pas permis d’aboutir à la 
constitution d’un État postcolonial pérenne. Bien que de nombreuses études 
juridiques et historiques se sont penchées sur le jugement de la Cour Internationale 
de Justice de 1975, cet article fournit un document hautement pertinent et jusqu’ici 
négligé, qui permet de discuter les actes de la Cour. Hidāyat man ḥārā fī amr al-
Naṣāra (« Conseils pour qui est désorienté par les chrétiens » était une décision 
légale au sujet de la défense du territoire, rédigée en 1885 par une figure centrale du 
discours nationaliste marocain: le savant saharien et leader de la résistance al-Shaikh 
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Mā al-ʻAynayn (1831-1910). Bien que le Maroc utilise Mā al-ʻAynayn comme 
preuve de sa « possession immémoriale » du Sahara Occidental contesté, le tribunal 
n’a pas examiné l’opinion elle-même ou les écrits de Mā al-ʻAynayn pour 
déterminer comment celui-ci se représentait et interprétait les événements 
historiques au moment où ils se déroulaient. Hidāyat man ḥārā fī amr al-Naṣāra 
offre de nouvelles perspectives pour apprécier comment des notables sahariens ont 
négocié autorité et légitimité au début de la colonisation – en particulier quelle fut la 
teneur des débats internes pour déterminer s’il fallait signer un accord de paix avec 
les colons européens ou les expulser par la force. Les concepts de territoire et de 
souveraineté exprimés dans la fatwa sont comparés aux récits historiques présentés à 
la Cour internationale de Justice en 1975. 
 
Mots-clés: Sahara Occidental, Mauritanie, Maroc, Cour internationale de Justice 
(CIJ), Nations unies, fatwas.  
 
 
The re-entry of Morocco into the African Union (AU) in January 2017 
briefly brought the suspended question of the disputed Western Sahara back 
onto an international stage (Mohammed 2017). The African Union had 
historically supported Western Saharan aspirations of independence from 
Morocco as a legitimate decolonization struggle, and the Sahrawi 
Democratic Republic (SADR) became a member back in 1982. However, 
one year after rejoining the AU, Morocco was able to effectively push the 
Western Sahara off the organization’s agenda and relegate it to a UN 
concern (PSC Report 2018). This represents a considerable win in the 
kingdom’s efforts to retain control of a mineral-rich territory where neither 
colonial borders nor precolonial history effectively translated into a coherent 
nation-state (San Martín 2010: 49-50). Although the United Nations 
brokered a ceasefire in September of 1991 and both Morocco and the 
Polisario Front agreed to a referendum on independence, it has never been 
held (King 2014: 71-91). Morocco’s berm wall cuts Saharans living in 
Algerian refugee camps off from those living in the Moroccan-occupied 
portion of the northwest Saharan and the kingdom’s control of the region 
continues with the help of American and French military aid (Mundy & 
Zunes 2010: 83). 
If the ideal of the nation-state can be seen as our time’s dominant 
narrative of space, history, and identity, then the 1975 International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) proceedings on the Western Sahara can be read as efforts to 
translate the northwest Sahara’s precolonial past – especially the late 
nineteenth century – into the idiom of nationhood. This was no easy feat 
considering both the anachronistic nature of the endeavor and the fact that 






















described as lacking central rule and as prioritizing tribal loyalties (N'Diaye 
2017: 36) 1 . At the International Court of Justice, both Morocco and 
Mauritania staked their claims to this quarter of the Sahara by using selected 
aspects of history to index nationalist ideals: Saharan displays of allegiance 
to the ‘Alawite sultans in Morocco’s case, and the Saharan Ādrār Emirate’s 
role in uniting nomadic Ḥassaniyya-Arabic speakers across tribes in 
Mauritania’s case. Mauritania also argued that the emirate was proof that the 
territorial concept of “Bilad Shinguitti” was effectively a predecessor of 
modern Mauritania. Both sides emphasized European documents and 
testimonies: Mauritania, for example, highlighted the fact that one of the 
amīrs of the Ādrār Emirate signed a treaty with the French explorer 
Lieutenant Léon Fabert (1848-1896) (ICJ Western Sahara Vol. III 1975: 21-
22, 85, 101). However, it was ultimately Morocco who was more invested in 
integrating the northwest Sahara: Mauritania withdrew all claims to the 
territory in 1979 (Reuters 1979). Morocco also submitted a total of 197 
documents to the ICJ as compared to Mauritania’s eleven. Several of 
Morocco’s sources focus on the links between the Saharan scholar, Sufi, and 
anticolonial resistance leader Mā al-ʻAynayn ibn Muḥammad Fāḍil ibn 
Māmīn (1831-1910) and the Moroccan ‘Alawite sultans (ICJ Western 
Sahara Vol. III: 222, 356-7, 474, 475-6, 478, 480). As the ICJ set time 
parameters emphasizing the period just prior to Spanish colonization of the 
Sahara, Morocco zoomed in on the construction of Villa Cisneros in the 
Dakhla Peninsula, pointing first to the Moroccan sultan’s protests to Madrid 
before describing early Saharan resistance to colonization: 
Le 9 mars 1885, deux mois après le début de la construction d'un fort 
à Villa Cisneros, les Espagnols subissent leur première attaque de la 
part des Marocains. Celle-ci se solde par la destruction de la 
construction, l'incendie des baraquements et par plusieurs morts et 
blessés du côté de l'occupant, obligeant les derniers survivants à se 
réembarquer pour les Canaries. Cette attaque donne lieu à une 
protestation officielle du Gouvernement espagnol auprès du Sultan, 
reconnaissance implicite mais significative du véritable maître de la 
terre (op. cit.: 159).  
What has come to light since the 1975 court proceedings, however, is the 
role that Mā al-ʻAynayn’s political strategy played in this battle. Not only 
did the shaikh participate in the Battle of Dakhla, he wrote about its 
aftermath. He defended his fighters’ seizure of Spanish property after the 
Amīr of Ādrār challenged its legality and demanded payment. This 
incomplete account of Mā al-ʻAynayn’s legacy is actually apparent 
throughout the ruling as not one of the dozens of books he wrote were 
 
1  See also the discussion of nineteenth-century sources on p. 11 of this article.  
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consulted as a source for understanding XIXth-century Saharan ideas of 
territory and political legitimacy. Although Mā al-ʻAynayn was discussed at 
length in the ICJ ruling and some of his correspondence to the Moroccan 
court was submitted for deliberation, his own thought was not taken into 
consideration (ICJ, Western Sahara Advisory Opinion 1975: § 102-103, pp. 
46-47).  
After the ICJ ruled that no existing state had strong enough evidence of 
immemorial possession to overrule the Sahrawis’ right to self-determination 
(Ibid.: § 92, p. 43), Mā al-ʻAynayn only became a more widespread 
nationalist symbol within Morocco. Dozens of books about the shaikh have 
been printed in the decades following the 1975 ruling, and the Moroccan 
government sponsors a yearly academic conference around his life and 
legacy (Al-Mukhtār 2019). In the process of studying Mā al-ʻAynayn, 
Moroccan scholarship still frames his life as proof of the kingdom’s 
immemorial ties to this quarter of the desert. However, thanks to this 
ongoing scholarly interest Mā al-ʻAynayn’s legal argument legitimizing the 
1885 Battle of Dakhla as an act of self-defensive jihād is now accessible. It 
can be analyzed as a primary source despite the fact that the paratext of the 
1999 reproduction still frames the fatwa in nationalist terms:  
As is evident from [the book's] title and from the issues it addresses, it 
returns to the [collective] memory an important event from the 
southern Moroccan regions near the end of the last century: the 1885 
Battle of Dakhla. This was a historic event that played a large role in 
igniting the feelings of Moroccan nationalism (waṭanīyā) in this 
historical period and in the obstruction of colonial projects in the 
Saharan regions (Māʼ al-ʻAynayn 1999: 8).   
The introduction then goes on to allude to the “Spanish conspiracy 
against Moroccan unity”, implying that Saharan nationalism is a colonial 
plot. This echoes other Moroccan publications about the shaikh, such as the 
historical study “Al-Shaikh Mā’ al-‘Aynain wa-jihāduhu al-‘ilmī wa-al-
waṭanī” (“Al-Shaikh Mā al-ʻAynayn and his Scholarly and Nationalist 
Endeavor”) which states that “The organization would like to thank the 
respected author for allowing it the honor of printing this book... during this 
time in which the Moroccan people are eager to close the Saharan issue once 
and for all”, implying that Mā al-ʻAynayn’s literature and anticolonial jihād 
offer clear proof of which nation-state can legitimately claim the northwest 
Sahara (Mā al-ʻAynayn 1995: 6). 
Of course as a nineteenth-century African Mā al-ʻAynayn did not speak 
the language of nation-state. While Morocco speaks now of waṭanīyā, the 
shaikh himself never used the term “waṭan”, (meaning country or homeland) 
and nor did he use “dawla” (the equivalent of state). Mā al-ʻAynayn did not 
rally his followers around the cause of a united Moroccan state: this 






















complex web of sometimes competing and often overlapping boundaries and 
loyalties (tribal divisions, Sufi paths, Islamic empires) in order to ensure the 
ultimate goal of evading Christian conquest (Patrizi 2015: 320, Martin 1976: 
125). Mā al-ʻAynayn alludes to this complexity in Hidāyat man ḥārā when 
he asserts that there was no time to consult the sultan before defending the 
Dakhla Peninsula against the Spanish occupiers (Ma’ al-Aynain & ibn 
Muḥammad Fāḍil 1999: 77).  
As this article will show, his fatwa both describes the reality of sība – 
often translated as dissidence or anarchy but here referring to the lack of 
central rule – and advocates for a new political reality in which all Muslims 
will unite around a single ruler. This theme of Muslim solidarity and unity 
comes to the fore in other famous writings by Mā al-ʻAynayn such as his 
poem declaring “I am in Brotherhood with All the Paths” and the 
accompanying sharḥ (explanatory text) in which he asserts that his Sufi 
upbringing and practice never involved taking prayers or practices from a 
single path or brotherhood (ṭarīqa) to the exclusion of another (Ibn 
Muḥammad Fāḍil & Al-Ẓarif 1999: 42).  
Before presenting Mā al-ʻAynayn’s portrayal of space and sovereignty on 
the eve of colonization, however, it is important to understand the 
geographic concepts Mauritania and Morocco relied on in their efforts to 
translate precolonial history into nationalist terms: Bilād al-Shinqīṭ and Bilād 
al-Sība.  
Shinqīṭ and Takrūr: the Bilād and the Ḥajj  
Mauritania presented the northwest Sahara as integral to its nationhood 
by evoking the territorial concept of Bilād al-Shinqīṭ, or “Bilad Shinguitti” 
as it was referred to in the ruling. The International Court of Justice 
summarized Mauritania’s argument as follows:  
That [Mauritanian] entity was the Bilad Shinguitti or Shinguitti 
country, which constituted a distinct human unit, characterized by a 
common language, way of life and religion. It had a uniform social 
structure, composed of three 'orders': warrior tribes exercising 
political power: marabout tribes engaged in religious, teaching, 
cultural, judicial and economic activities: client-vassal tribes under the 
protection of a warrior or marabout tribe (ICJ, Western Sahara 
Advisory Opinion 1975: § 131, pp. 57-58). 
This description is accurate in terms of the common cultural and social 
traits it highlights as shared across Ḥassaniya-speaking Saharan tribes. What 
is less clear, however, is the extent to which those living within the region 
identified with the concept of Bilād Shinqīṭ prior to Spanish colonization or 
referred to themselves as shinqīṭī. In fact, a brief conceptual history of Bilād 
Shinqīṭ shows that – like its predecessor Bilād Takrūr – it was a loosely-
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defined exonym and never a unified social-political identity nor a clearly 
demarcated geography.  
One of the first references to Bilād Takrūr appeared in Kitāb al-Masālik 
wa al-Mamālik (“The Book of Routes and Kingdoms”) by the XIth century 
Andalusian historian Abū ʻUbayd ʻAbd Allāh ibn ʻAbd al-ʻAzīz Bakrī. Bakrī 
describes a Muslim Kingdom located on the Senegal River called “Bilād al-
Takrūr” which fought alongside the Almoravids (al-Naqar 1969: 4). Long 
after Takrūr stopped being a capital city in this region, however, the 
designation of “Bilād Takrūr” was still used by Muslim geographers and the 
term sometimes encompassed the northwestern part of the Sahara. 
Mauritanian historian Ḥamāh Allāh wuld al-Sālim notes that, for a time, 
Arabs in the Middle East and the Hijaz designated all scholars from the 
northwest Sahara or sub-Saharan Africa as “ʻUlamā al-Takrūr” (scholars of 
Takrūr), further supporting this connection  (Wuld al-Sālim 2004: 5). The 
takrūrī designation was apparently embraced by some Saharan scholars as 
well, such as Muḥammad ibn Abī Bakr al-Ṣiddīq Bartallī al-Walātī (d. 
1219/1805) whose biographical dictionary Fatḥ al-shakūr fī ma‘rifat a‘yān 
‘ulamā’ al-Takrūr (“The Gracious Opening in Knowledge of the Nobles of 
the Takrūrī Scholars”) includes figures from the Saharan towns of Chinguetti 
(“Shinqīṭ” in Arabic) and Walata as well as the regions of Tagant and the 
Gibla (al-Walātī 1981). 
Although there are a couple of earlier texts which used the term “Bilād 
al-Shinqīṭ”, it appears to have become more widespread than “Bilād al-
Takrūr” sometime during the XIXth century. Like Bilād Takrūr, it was also a 
Middle Eastern exonym. The scholar Sīdī ʻAbd Allāh ibn al-Ḥājj Ibrāhīm (d. 
1818) says of the term “shinqīṭī”:  
The caravan would leave from Chinguetti (Shinqīṭ) every year and 
those from all horizons who wanted to would make the pilgrimage 
with it, until the people of these lands (hādhihi al-bilād) – I mean from 
the Saqiya al-Hamra to the Sudan to Arwan – became known among 
the people of the Mashriq as “al-Shanājiṭa” 2  even until now (bin 
Muḥammad Maḥmūd 2001: 37-38).  
The slippage between Bilād Takrūr and Bilād Shinqīṭ parallels the late-
XIXth century debate in the Hijaz regarding whether Bilād Shinqīṭ was part 
of Bilād al-Maghrib or Bilād al-Sudan. The Mufti of Medina eventually ruled 
that the “Shanāqiṭa” were from Bilād al-Sudan, which barred them from 
charitable trusts and scholarly positions designated for Maghribis (Wuld al-
Sālim 2004: 257-258). This further supports the observation that the 
 























designations of “shinqīṭī” and “takrūrī” were strongly tied to the process of 
pilgrimage and encountering Muslims from outside of the region: neither 
concept was endogenous. How influential, then, would the concept of Bilād 
Shinqīṭ have been among populations in the northwest Sahara? Was 
Mauritania correct to assert that this conception and identity was a precursor 
to their nation-state?  
The main reason a shinqīṭī identity is unlikely to have been widespread 
among Arabophone populations in the northwest Sahara is that the ḥajj itself 
was not common. There were ḥajj caravans leaving from Walata and 
Chinguetti in the XVIIIth and XIXth centuries, and there also existed a 
network of Saharans living in the Mashriq and the Hijaz along with 
charitable trusts (ḥubus) for Saharan pilgrims. Yet, many ʻulamā from the 
northwest Sahara ruled that the ḥajj was not obligatory considering its 
especially arduous nature (al-Idrīsī  2009: 114). Historian Charles C. Stewart 
notes in his study of al-Shaikh Sīdiyya al-Kabīr (1775-1868) that “The 
pilgrimage (ḥajj) was an observance which required impressive fortitude, 
and in the early nineteenth century was undertaken only with extreme 
difficulty for the West African pilgrim. As a result, until the present [i.e. 
20th] century relatively few Moors took part in the ḥajj” (Stewart & Stewart 
1973: 67).  
Mā al-ʻAynayn himself provides an illustrative example: despite his 
father’s status as an influential political figure on both sides of the Senegal 
River, Mā al-ʻAynayn was the first of his family to complete the pilgrimage 
to Mecca and make it back alive (McLaughlin 1997). If this was a common 
or expected outcome, then his ḥajj would not have been recorded as a 
miraculous deed by his descendants (Ibn al-ʻAtīq 2004: 318). Furthermore, 
Mā al-ʻAynayn never references Bilād Shinqīṭ or describes himself as 
“shinqīṭī” in his pilgrimage travelogue. He mentions that there is a trustee of 
the Shanāqiṭa in Mecca, as it is only in the Hijaz that such an appellation had 
meaning (ibn Muḥammad Fāḍil & Murabbīh Rabbuh 2010: 69). 
The other issue regarding Mauritania’s narrative is the extent to which 
Saharans saw the amīrs of the Adrār as unifying rulers whose power 
superseded tribal alliances and divisions. Mauritania certainly aimed to paint 
the rulers of the Adrār Emirate in such a light, stating:  
At the time of the Spanish colonization of Western Sahara, Mauritania 
maintains, the Emir of the Adrar was the principal political figure of the 
north and north-west Shinguitti country, and possessed “an influence 
extending from the Sakiet El Hamra to the Senegal”. In this connection, it 
invokes the testimony of the Spanish explorer, Captain Cervera, who in 
1886 concluded with the Emir at ‘Ijil a treaty by which, had it been 
ratified, Spain would have been recognized as sovereign of the whole 
Adrar at-Tmarr (ICJ Western Sahara Advisory Opinion 1975: § 133, p. 
58). 
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This matter comes to the fore in Hidāyat man ḥārā as Mā al-ʻAynayn 
addresses his ruling to Aḥmad bin Imḥammad bin ʻĪdah (d. 1898) who ruled 
the Ādrār emirate from 1872 to 1891.  
From Bilād al-Sība to Saharan Wing  
Before describing Mā al-ʻAynayn’s conception of Saharan sovereignty 
and self-defense as outlined by his fatwa, it is important to understand the 
fluid nature of contact between the northwest Sahara and the Moroccan 
Sultanate. Prior to colonization, many regions of Morocco were not directly 
under the Moroccan sultan’s control, which is why Morocco asked that “the 
Court should take account of the special structure of the Sherifian State (op. 
cit.: § 94, pp. 43-44).” In the precolonial period, areas where tribal rule was 
stronger than the Moroccan sultan’s influence were referred to as “bilād al-
sība”, whereas those which consistently paid taxes to the treasury were 
“bilād al-makhzen” (lands of the treasury) (Castellino & Domínguez-
Redondo 2014: 49). The northwest Sahara was usually part of “bilād al-
sība”, although neither category was rigid or absolute (Trout 1969: 24). 
Historically the ‘Alawite sultans would lead occasional raids called maḥallas 
or ḥarkas against the refractory tribes in order to re-assert authority 
(Raymond 1977: 273). Those living on the fringes of the sultan’s influence 
would also usually recognize him as a religious authority.  
Scholars have recently called into question whether the bilād al-sība/ 
bilād al-makhzen divide is primarily a colonial construct (Mohamed 
2012:  6). For example, Moroccan historian Abdallah Laroui summarizes 
“Colonial ideology represented the bilād al-sība as independent territories, 
in which the Sultan's sovereignty was purely nominal and amounted only to 
religious influence” and argues that this was simply a colonial interpretation 
of Moroccan norms of rulership (Laroui 1985: 93). Edmund Burke III shows 
how French colonial rhetoric pushed the idea that the Makhzen (central 
government) and the tribes were in perpetual conflict in order to both justify 
colonization and to blame all French policy failures on the supposedly 
anarchic and tribal nature of Morocco (Burke 2014: 77). Most historians 
acknowledge that there were tribes and regions which paid taxes to the 
sultan and those which did not but, as André Raymond summarizes, “[t]here 
was moreover no real frontier between the submissive bled el-makhzen and 
the dissident bled el-siba: their respective areas varied according to the 
power of the government, and some tribes lived in an intermediate state 
between total submission and independence.” (Raymond 1977: 274). 
Stephen Baier similarly notes that most parts of the bilād al-sība were 
economically and culturally tied to bilād al-makhzen (Baier 1978: 5). 
However, what is missing from these discussions is how the term sība 






















Arabic sources from both the Amazigh-majority areas of the Atlas 
Mountains and from the northwest Sahara (Kīkī  & Tawfīq 1997: 146). The 
idea is also enduring, as anthropologist Amal Rassam Vinogradov noted that 
the Ait Ndhir Amazigh tribe still alluded to the days of “sība” during her 
fieldwork (Vinogradov 1974: 5). David M. Hart also found that his 
interviewees from the Saharan Rgaybat (Reguibat) tribe still referred to the 
precolonial period as a time of “sība” (Hart 2007: 43). In both of these cases 
sība was used to refer to a political state of affairs rather than a bounded 
territority, an important nuance from the colonial misinterpretation.  
In Aḥmad Tawfīq’s analysis of Muḥammad ibn ʻAbd Allāh Kīkī’s 
(d. 1771) compilation Mawāhib Dhī al-Jalāl fī nawāzil al-bilād al-sāʾibah 
wa-al-jibāl (“Noble Gifts in the Rulings of the Dissident Lands and the 
Mountains”), Tawfīq translates bilād al-sība as “the country where justice is 
not administered” (op. cit.: 147). Based on the longer trajectory of fiqh 
literature Tawfīq argues:  
…“sā'iba” is not a creation of a colonial literature, and that its original 
meaning is related to the condition of the practice of Islamic justice, 
and the nature of rapport between the governor and the governed, 
which are both assimilated to the relationship between the sheperd and 
his herd (Ibid.: 146). 
Mauritanian scholar Aḥmad Maḥfūẓ Mannāh similarly shows that jurists 
from the Ḥassanophone region used the term sība to describe the tense 
atmosphere of the northwest Sahara and to argue for greater unity and 
centralization (Mannāh 1994: 46). For example, in a text written slightly 
after Māʼ al-ʻAynayn’s time, al-Shaikh Sīdīyah Bābah laments that the 
reason for the current and past wars between the scholarly tribes occupying 
the northwest Sahara is the sība of these parts (ibn Muḥammad Maḥmūd: 
44). Sīdī Muḥammad bin al-Mukhtār Kuntī (1765-1826), son of the famous 
Sufi Shaikh al-Mukhtār Kuntī (1730-1811), referred to “al-bilād al-sa’iba” 
in his political epistle Al-Risāla al-Ghalāwīya (Kuntī & wuld al-Sālim 2013: 
p. 291). Al-Shaikh Muḥammad al-Māmī (1792-1866) also described the 
northwest Sahara as existing in a state of sība, meaning there was no central 
ruler for the tribes to unite around and instead they could attack or be 
attacked at any moment (Acloque 2014: 127). Thus, Māʼ al-ʻAynayn alludes 
to a larger body of legal thought when he refers to the Dakhla Peninsula and 
its surroundings as “sa’iba”( Māʼ al-ʻAynayn: 78-79). To return to the ICJ, 
Morocco did not argue to the court that this division never existed, but rather 
that it “merely described two types of relationship between the Moroccan 
local authorities and the central power, not a territorial separation” (ICJ 
Western Sahara Advisory Opinion 1975: § 96, pp. 44-45). What then, would 
this relationship have been on the eve of colonization?  
The degree to which the Ḥassanophone tribes identified with the ‘Alawite 
domain is nebulous. One disciple of Mā al-ʿAynain’s father, Abū Bakr ibn 
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Aḥmad al-Muṣṭafá Maḥjūbī, included an XVIIIth c. Moroccan sultan in his 
biographical dictionary of the Sufi saints of Bilād al-Takrūr3, showing that 
some scholars from the Ḥawḍ considered the ʿAlawites to be figures of 
Islamic authority (McLaughlin: 124). There were also two other scholars from 
the Ḥassanophone region who visited the court of the Sultan Mawlāy ʻAbd 
al-Raḥmān (r. 1822-1859) before Mā al-ʻAynayn did, but neither of them 
went on to establish ongoing political ties to the ‘Alawites (Norris  1977: 8, 
18). In fact, as H.T. Norris observes, reading Mā al-ʻAynayn’s predecessor 
Aḥmad ibn Ṭuwayr al-Janna’s (1788-1849) record of his 1829 visit seems to 
reveal the sultan’s total ignorance of the region. Mawlāy ʻAbd al-Raḥmān 
asks ibn Ṭuwayr al-Jannah about whether there is any agriculture or 
scholarship in the Sahara. In turn, ibn Ṭuwayr al-Jannah suggests that 
scholarship in the sultan’s region could be improved by offering better 
sponsorship of the ʻulamā, showing that he did not see the ‘Alawite court as 
a destination for learning (Ibid.).  
To return to Mā al-ʻAynayn, it does not appear that he identified with the 
Moroccan domain by the time he set out on his pilgrimage. In fact, in one 
story associated with his ḥajj, the shaikh states that in his lands there is no 
sultan and instead each tribe has a leader which they defer to. He also refers 
to Ḥassāniya, the dialect of Arabic spoken in Mauritania and the Western 
Sahara, as his language (ibn Muḥammad Fāḍil & Murabbīh Rabbuh: 46-47). 
Thus the ties he established with the ‘Alawite Sultans should be considered a 
deliberate political strategy rather than a natural and inevitable consequence 
of a long-standing association. Considering that Mā al-ʻAynayn grew up in 
the Ḥawḍ (what is now southeastern Mauritania bordering Mali), he could 
have connected his jihād to the legacy of Sufi resistance leader al-Ḥājj 
‘Umar Tāll (1794-1864) and promoted a trans-Saharan Takrūrī entity with 
the neighboring Futa Toro. Or he could have sought an expansion of one of 
the Saharan emirates, as he had cultural and familial ties to the Ādrār (ibn 
Aḥmad Sālim 2004). Theoretically, he could have even approached the 
Ottomans for the military and symbolic aid the ‘Alawites provided him, as 
they did sponsor the scholarly work of Saharan Muḥammad Maḥmūd 
Shinqīṭī al-Turkuzī (1829-1904). (Shinqīṭī al-Turkuzī 1901). However, the 
‘Alawites represented the strongest bulwark against European colonization 
and so a mutually-beneficial alliance was formed.  
By visiting the Moroccan Sultan and swearing an oath of loyalty (bay’a) 
to him during his ḥajj, the young Mā al-ʻAynayn began his career of 
strengthening ties between his Saharan Sufi followers and the ‘Alawite 
 
3 The biographical dictionary, which was apparently styled after a compilation by Muḥammad 
ibn Abī Bakr al-Ṣiddīq al-Bartallī al-Walātī, was titled Minaḥ al-Rabb al-Ghafūr fī dhikr 






















domain through writing, building zawiyas in major Moroccan cities, and 
making frequent scholarly visits to the court. When he built his flagship Sufi 
city of Smāra it was not an expression of Morocco’s “immemorial 
possession” of the northwest Sahara. Rather, it was a strategic political move 
to strengthen the links between the Ḥassanophone domain and the seat of 
Moroccan power. Did the relationship between the shaikh and the sultan, 
however, constitute one of co-operation between equals – as Spain and 
Mauritania argued before the ICJ – or was it an extension of the ‘Alawite 
sultans’ authority? This is one of the primary issues Hidāyat man ḥārā fī 
amr al-Naṣārá can provide new insight into.  
Law, Order, and Geography in Mā al-ʻAynayn’s Fatwa  
Shaikh Mā al-ʻAynayn wrote his legal ruling Hidāyat man ḥārā fī amr al-
Naṣārá in 1885, one year after Spain proclaimed a protectorate over the Rio 
de Oro, and one year after what the UN ruling marked as the beginning of 
“the time of colonization by Spain” (ICJ Western Sahara Advisory Opinion 
1975: § 77, p. 38). The Battle of Dakhla also took place one year before the 
Amīr of Ādrār drafted a treaty with a Spanish explorer, an event which 
formed a crucial point in Mauritania’s argument (op. cit.: § 133, p. 58). In 
addition to the Spanish settlements in the northwest Sahara, Scotsman 
Donald MacKenzie had set up a trading post at Tarfaya (“Cape Juby”) after 
concluding an 1879 treaty with al-Shaikh Mohamed Beyrouk (Trout: 150). The 
strategy of piecemeal colonization, or gradually building more settlements by 
making trading contracts with Sufi and tribal leaders, had begun. Xavier 
Coppolani, the architect of Mauritania’s colonization, would soon start 
applying the same strategy from French West Africa moving north in 1901.  
While some Saharan leaders accepted the foreign presence in exchange 
for certain privileges and concessions – including Mā al-ʻAynayn’s own 
brother Sa’adbouh – Mā al-ʻAynayn was the principal figure of jihād in the 
region and was actively pushing Saharans to unite around the Moroccan 
sultan in order to resist colonization. The shaikh led fighters from the Awlād 
Dulaym, Awlād Tīdirārīn, and al-ʻArūsiyīn tribes in attacking Spanish 
settlers in the Dakhla Peninsula in 1885. After they successfully drove the 
Spaniards out and seized their property, Aḥmad bin Imḥammad bin ʻĪdah, 
the Amīr of the Saharan Ādrār emirate, approached the fighters and 
demanded a share of the spoils on the basis that he had a contract (‘aqd) with 
the settlers (Māʼ al-ʻAynayn & ibn Muḥammad Fāḍil: 13-14). In response, 
Mā al-ʻAynayn wrote this fatwa justifying the tribes’ right to their plunder 
on several grounds, including that the Christians involved did not have 
“dhimmī” (protected minority) status.  
Reading the fatwa firsthand shows that – contrary to recent scholarship 
dismissing sība as a colonial construct – Mā al-ʻAynayn describes the region 
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surrounding the Dakhla Peninsula as existing in a state of sība. Rather than 
supporting the nationalist narrative of an eternal and unchanging bond 
between ‘Alawite Morocco and the northwest Sahara, it also indicates that 
Mā al-ʻAynayn was propagating a vision of all Muslims uniting around a 
single Islamic authority and repelling foreign invasion while also describing 
a space where political loyalties were fluid and the Moroccan sultan’s power 
was usually understood in abstract terms. Additionally, the text shows that 
Mā al-ʻAynayn’s erudition was clearly a source of authority. He argues for 
sovereignty and self-defense using evidence from the Qur’ān, the Ḥadīth, 
and the fiqh tradition, and these sources come up much more frequently than 
any particular political figure. The most heavily cited source after the Qur’ān 
and the Ḥadīth is the tafsīr Rūḥ al-Bayān (“The Spirit of Elucidation”) by 
Ottoman Sufi scholar Ismāʻīl Ḥaqqī Ibn Muṣṭafá (1652-1725).  
Although “Dār al-Islām” and “Dār al-Ḥarb” are the primary geographic 
designations in the larger fiqh tradition, Mā al-ʻAynayn opts to speak in 
terms of “Bilād al-Muslimīn”, hinting at a more fractured and less 
territorially contiguous geography than “dār” (domain). The shaikh does not 
attempt to define what larger entity the Dakhla Peninsula belongs to, but 
rather speaks in terms of “these lands” (hādhihi al-bilād) or “our lands” 
(bilādina) or “the lands of the Muslims” (bilād al-Muslimin). There is not a 
single reference to Bilād al-Maghrib or Bilād Shinqīṭ. 
While it could be that a man with such a large transregional network 
opted to speak in vague terms in order to make the ruling applicable 
elsewhere, the inclusion of many local referents and figures belies this 
theory and show that the fatwa assumed a deep background knowledge of 
the northwest Sahara. Mā al-ʻAynayn references Muḥammad bin Sayyid 
Balkhayr Āzragī, a noble of the Saharan Āzragīn tribe, without elaborating 
on who he is despite the fact that his contacts in Cairo or even in Fez would 
not have heard of him. Similarly, he refers to the Imraguen, a tributary social 
group which subsists on fishing, without explaining who they are:  
I knew without any doubt that those unbelievers of which we are 
speaking ambushed the Lands of the Muslims with their entrance in it 
and upon [the Muslims] without permission from anyone. As such, 
fighting them became the duty of whoever was near them since they 
invaded the Imraguen who do not have the ability to defend 
themselves (op. cit.: 77). 
In this excerpt, specifically local references coexist with the geographic 
ideal of Bilād al-Muslimīn, thus translating Islamic solidarity into terms 
relevant to the northwest Sahara. While “Bilād al-Dakhla” or “Bilād al-
Imraguen” would be more specific, the shaikh creates a sense of solidarity 
across existing social divisions by using the term Bilād al-Muslimīn. 
Through this ideal, he can then call on his audience to come to the armed 






















The lack of reference to Bilād al-Maghrib or to Bilād al-Makhzen should 
also be understood as the shaikh’s diplomatic dealing with an amīr who 
recognized the authority of the Moroccan sultan in a more abstract sense4. 
For this reason, there is only one brief mention of the Moroccan Sultan 
Mawlāy al-Ḥasan (r. 1873-1894), who is shown as an example of an Islamic 
authority signing off on a tribal raid against Christians after the fact. Mā al-
ʻAynayn relays a story in which the aforementioned Āzragī seizes the house 
of a Spanish settler and then sells it (Ibid.: 78). Mā al-ʻAynayn then explains 
that ‘the news reached the Sultan Mawlāy al-Ḥasan, so he made 
supplications for his [Āzragī’s] well-being and said “there was nothing he 
was to do other than kill him [i.e. the Spaniard], as it happened like this. By 
God, let there be only the contract which they call the contract of combat 
which the Ahl al-Ghazāl [tribe] and others act on!”’ (Ibid.: 77). Thus the 
sultan’s authority comes to the fore in the sense of approving an act of war 
which is already accomplished as Islamically correct, not as the man who 
must be consulted before undertaking a raid or battle.  
As the previous passage alludes to, Mā al-ʻAynayn also built part of his 
justification for the raid on the political fluidity of the northwest Sahara. The 
lack of an accessible central authority made seeking permission from the 
sultan or an amīr impractical in the case of a sudden invasion. Thus, as was 
the case in Dakhla, when the Christians invaded it was the duty of all nearby 
Muslims to contribute to the defensive jihād. In this passage, he addresses 
the Amīr of Ādrār’s main objection to the Battle of Dakhla: that the latter 
had a treaty (ʻahd) with the Spanish settlers:  
As for the claim of the dissenting authority [i.e. the Amīr of Ādrār] 
that they [the Christians] sent themselves to him: they sent themselves 
to each tribe that covers these lands (hadhahi al-bilād) which they 
invaded. This was with their knowledge of its anarchy (sība) and the 
lack of rule, for the most part, of any of its people over anyone. And 
what is that from them [the Christians] other than cheating the 
Muslims, and baiting them against each other? What I verified of this 
was eight documents, and all of them say “we have a treaty.” Due to 
this [strategy], they did not mention who came to them, as you claim, 
[saying] that they have a treaty with anyone (Ibid.: 78). 
Mā al-ʻAynayn goes on to connect sība to the nature of relations between 
the Ḥassanophone tribes and the Christians, and to point to this as 
precedence for dealing with non-Muslims in the region. Thus his argument 
 
4 Pierre Bonte notes that, according to one source, increased trade between the Adrār and 
Morocco prompted the Sutlan Mawlāy al-Ḥasan to send a delegation to Aḥmad bin 
Imḥammad bin ʻĪdah in 1880. However, there is no evidence that bin ʻĪdah ever consulted 
the sultan in political matters (Bonte 2014).  
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defending the Saharan jihad, at least as he presents it to another Saharan 
authority figure, is based more on the region’s lack of a sultan than it is on 
the material and spiritual endorsement Mā al-ʻAynayn received from the 
Moroccan sultan. Here “sība” can be understood to be the lack of a mutually 
agreed upon law, contract, or authority:  
What treaty is there between the people of these lands (ahl hathahi al-
bilād) with the Christians other than killing and capturing? This was 
from the time of [the XIth c. Lamtuna Berber who lead the Murābiṭūn 
movement] Bubakr bin ʻĀmir, God rest his soul. They were [i.e. the 
lands] from that time anarchic (sā’iba). (Ibid.: 78-79). 
Atlhough Hidāyat man ḥārā concerns a local dispute, Mā al-ʻAynayn 
was well-travelled and well-read, and his ruling still displays an expansive 
geographic imagination. Mā al-ʻAynayn places the Battle of Dakhla within 
the context of struggles against colonization throughout the larger Islamic 
World, expressing shock at those who think the Christian invasions will not 
harm the Muslims. This must be, he surmises, due to their ignorance of what 
the Christians have always done during their invasions, from Al-Andalus in 
the past to Algeria in the present – not to mention the Christian meddling in 
Alexandria, Cairo, and Istanbul (Ibid.: 103). He concludes that the Christians 
are “a people who only want to own Muslim lands or rather, if they could, 
their necks,” and that this was apparent from the beginning, when they 
seized the land of the Imraguen while acting like they were helping them 
(Ibid.: 101). 
Although the shaikh’s descriptions of how authority and territory played 
out in the XIXth c. northwest Sahara may leave doubts about the true extent 
of Moroccan sultan’s influence, it should be noted that sība does not reflect 
Mā al-ʻAynayn’s political ideal. Near the end of his fatwa, he introduces the 
concept of “Imām al-Muslimīm” (Leader of the Muslims) and calls for a 
single Islamic authority who protects all Muslims from the unbelievers’ 
invasions:  
However, the Leader of the Muslims is responsible for the security of 
those [Muslims] outside of his region (iqlīm), in other words an 
innumerable number, even if it is not one of The Seven Regions which 
are: India, Hijaz, Egypt, Babel, Rome, Turkey, Gog and Magog, and 
China. As for the Maghrib and the Levant, they are from Egypt as 
evidenced by the sameness of their inhabitants. Yemen and Abyssinia 
are part of the Hijaz. Each subregion of these regions is 700 leagues, 
so there are innumerable mountains and valleys planted like them. The 
great sea surrounds that, and it in turn is surrounded by the mountain 
of Qāf (Ibid.: 93). 
In sum, while other categories of places and peoples are referenced, it is 






















Naṣārá. Similar to the fatwa of Sufi resistance figure al-Amīr ʻAbd al-Qādir 
(1808-1883) of Algeria, Mā al-ʻAynayn always refers to the invaders as 
Christians or nonbelievers, and the current conflict with them is compared to 
boundary shifts in Islamic Spain (Woerner-Powell 2011: 237). Neither the 
Ottoman nor the ‘Alawite domains are referenced in specific terms, but 
rather the emphasis is on defending “Bilād al-Muslimīn” from Christians. He 
does not imply that “Imām al-Muslimīm” is any specific person ruling at his 
moment in history, but rather alludes to this figure as a Pan-Islamic ideal. 
Foundational Islamic texts are referenced much more heavily than any 
particular political figure. Thus, although there is no way to know whether or 
not Mā al-ʻAynayn would have wanted the Western Sahara to be ruled by 
the current Moroccan monarchy, it is anachronistic to turn him into a 
nationalist. While he may not have collaborated with the ‘Alawite Sultans as 
a complete equal, he was active in negotiating competing loyalties and 
rallying different parties around the ultimate cause of resisting Christian 
occupation of the northwest Sahara. He envisioned a Sahara united around a 
single Muslim ruler who would defend their lands and all others from 
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